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This article contributes to the growing research base in Turkish popular music studies with a focus on indie music 
from Istanbul. It situates this music within ¢Ȃ contemporary social, cultural and political landscapes, and in 
relation to the ¢Ȃ historical cultural narrative.  Istanbul indie musiciansȂ responses to the 2013 Gezi protests 
suggest that Ȃ counter-hegemonic aesthetics are being explored and engaged with in alignment with ȁ 
Ȃǰ an emerging vision for Turkey that holds liberalism and human rights as its core ideals where the  




In 2006, in a  special edition of Music and Anthropology, Martin Stokes asserted that Turkish music 
studies ȁǽ Ǿ benefit from a critical and systematic consideration of everyday popular culture, 
which has long been Ȃ (n.p).  Much useful work has been done in this regard over the past 
decade, with studies of both mainstream pop and subcultures such as hip-hop (e.g. Solomon, 2005), 
heavy metal (Hecker 2012) and punk (Boynik and 	ûÍ 2008) now complementing the more 
substantial research base around genres such as arabesk and Turkish art music.  This paper 
contributes to this body of work with a focus on Ȃ indie scene in the second decade of the 
21st Century.  This scene is of particular significance for a number of reasons. Most notably, its 
demographics correspond to a young, secular-minded middle class whose musical tastes and 
consumption patterns have rarely been examined in depth in academic research, where focus has 
tended towards those of the socioeconomic periphery.  
 
The genre that has received the most attention in this regard is arabesk. Despite Ȃ association 
with economic migrants and the urban poor (Stokes 1992), its appeal has exceeded these origins to 
achieve a near ubiquity in ¢Ȃ popular music tastes (Özgür 2006), accompanying a renewed 
acceptance of eastern identity across all strata of society. This has occurred alongside the resurgence 
of political Islam, and a shift in the balance of power away from the historically secular ȁ Ȃ 
elite towards an ascendant ȁ Ȃ religious elite (Pope 2012). As such, the tastes of the 
periphery have achieved purchase at the centre, complicating the centre/periphery model applied 
by Stokes (1992) and others. A corollary of this reorientation is that western cultural tastes are losing 
their dominance at the centre, and the aesthetics of the public sphere are becoming more Islamic 
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ǻ	ãÍ and Secor 2015).   This aesthetic shift has been the cause of much social tension since 
2010 in particular.  Although the motivations of recent civil unrest in Turkey are complex and 
multifarious, the initial premise of the Gezi protests of 2013 was resistance against the proposed 
construction of a neo-Ottoman shopping centre on the edge of Taksim Square, which 	ãÍ 
and Secor (2015) suggest was ȁ of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Í 
Partisi, hereafter ǼȂ urban projects that have privatised urban space and shaped it to the tastes 
of a certain Islamically-oriented, bourgeois segment of the Ȃ (p.26).  Alongside significant 
actual violence, the ensuing protests played out through symbolic conflict, wherein Taksim Square 
itself was invoked as a ȁ political Ȃ (Diken 2014; p.321) enshrined in the protest slogan 
ȁ¢  is Ȃǯ          
    
 
Indie has been described as a ȁ-Ȃ music genre (Hesmondhalgh 1999) associated 
with anti-establishment ethics and political antagonism (Jones 2013). Istanbul indie musiciansȂ 
responses to the 2013 Gezi protests suggest that this dissident aspect is being explored and engaged 
with in alignment with the Gezi movement, and with what Diken (2014) terms ȁ 
Ȃǰ an emerging vision of Turkey that holds liberalism and human rights as its core 
ideals where the  ȁȂ and ȁȂ Republican visions held secularism and Islam respectively.  
For this and other reasons, indie warrants attention among the musical forms through which groups 
and individuals have constructed their identities and expressed their orientations within ¢Ȃ 
shifting ideological landscape.  Importantly, Ȃ indie scene provides an illuminating and 
timely counterpoint to the body of writing that approaches Turkish popular music in terms of 
reactions to the westernising project of the 20th Century State (e.g. Karahasanoࡅlu and Skoog 2009;  
Stokes 1992), and a fresh focus through which to explore global issues of culture, society and politics.  
 
The first part of this article is given over to a brief historical account of the political landscape in 
Turkey from the formation of the Republic in 1923 to the present day, using Ȃ distinctions of 
First, Second and Third Republicanisms as a discursive framework.  The impact of politics upon 
Turkish popular aesthetics, and vice versa, is also discussed.  In the second part of the paper I review 
previous work on Turkish popular music, and identify and compare several theoretical dualisms 
within this literature that are pertinent to a reading of Turkish indie.  In the third section I discuss 
the case of punk- a direct aesthetic and ideological precursor to indie- in Turkey, drawing out 
similarities, points of overlap and divergences with indie, before focusing directly on the case of 
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indie music in Istanbul in the fourth section.  Drawing on existing media interviews and press 
archives, I explore the experiences of musicians in Ȃ indie scene, gaining insight into its 
emerging aesthetics and ideological underpinnings, before analysing two songs (one with an 
accompanying music video) from Istanbul indie bands that engage with the Gezi protests in 
different ways. In the final section I consider these findings in relation to the earlier-discussed 
theoretical issues, and situate indie music within the Turkish cultural and political landscapes. I 
argue that Turkish indie musicians have perceived an ideological affinity between indie music and 
the civic ideals of Third Republicanism, and have employed indie aesthetics in challenging the 
dominant order.  
 
Hegemonic aesthetics and ¢Ȃ three republicanisms 
 
An understanding of the Republic of ¢Ȃ history is crucial to the study of the ¢Ȃ cultural 
phenomena.  Accordingly, most writing on Turkish popular music has, in varying degrees of detail, 
offered an account of Turkish political developments in the 20th century following the formation of 
the Republic in 1923.  Perhaps the most important thing to note here is that the Republican nation 
state established in 1923 was a means to secure a homeland for the Muslim peoples of the Ottoman 
Empire, following the Ȃ collapse.  In this regard, the Republic of ¢Ȃ very raison Ȃêtre was 
religion-bound (Mango 1997).  At the same time however, the project was modelled on the secular 
precedent of French laïcité which demanded the driving of religion out of the public sphere.  This 
paradox inheres in the Turkish flag, the emblem of a staunchly secular Republic, yet which bears the 
pan-Islamic symbol of crescent and star.  
 
The sociopolitical landscape of the 20th century was marked by oscillations across the ideological 
dualism of Islamism and secularism.  In the early decades of the Republic, Atatürk and his 
successors made radical reforms in all aspects of public life, in an attempt to position Turkey 'among 
the  Ȃ most civilised nations' ( Atatürk, 1933)1. These reforms were predicated on a Eurocentric 
understanding of civilisation, coupled with the notion of an ȁȂ Turkish culture, premised 
on the writings of the poet and sociologist Ziya Gökalp.  Believing aesthetics, and music in 
particular, to be a central pillar of nationhood, Gökalp (1923) proposed that Turkey reject what he 
                                                 
1
 'Yurdumuzu, dünyanin en mamur ve en medenî memleketleri seviyesine çikaracagiz¶. These words are taken from ûȂ on 
the 10th anniversary of the Republic in 1933, and paraphrase an earlier similar declaration from 1923. 
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saw as foreign and inauthentic Arab and Byzantine influences and reassert its Turkic cultural 
heritage2  	ãȂ collation of Turkish music into categories of western, eastern, modern and old, 
Ottoman and Turkish ǻȂǰ 2000, p.123) was enacted posthumously (he died in 1923) by the 
State, beginning with the closure of the Ottoman art music department (Â û£Â k) in the 
¦ûȂl-Elhan (the Ottoman precursor to Istanbul University), and the creation of a European style 
State Conservatory charged with producing and curating a Turkish repertoire of western art music.  
As Özgür (2006) notes, ȁ were [expected] to welcome western music because, unlike eastern 
music, it was logical and Ȃ (p.177).  This new national high culture form was to be infused 




This understanding of Turkish culture and nationhood corresponds to what Diken (2014) terms 
ȁ Ȃǰ a value system centred around the ideal of secularism, and which is enshrined 
in the founding constitution of the Republic of Turkey.  Following the move to democracy between 
1945 and 1950 however, politicians awake to the eastern orientation and Islamic values of much of 
the population sought to reintroduce both into public life, to varying degrees ǻ	ãÍ and Secor 
2015).   Stokes (2010) describes the period from 1950 to 2010 as Turkey's 'liberal period', despite rarely 
being 'liberal' in the common sociopolitical sense (Stokes acknowledges this semantic tension), to 
highlight the breadth of structuring elements including 'religion, political pluralism, the market, and 
an orientation to ȃȄ forces we would now label ȃ£Ȅ- all set within the context of 
a hitherto authoritarian, secular, and generally inward-looking political cultureȂ (p.33). In the 
interests of space, I must leave aside discussion of the bulk of this period, but with the caveat that 
this means glossing over some significant junctures.  Some of these, notably the 1980 military coup 
d'état, are discussed as necessary later in this paper.  
The AKP have held office in Turkey since 2002. The AKP have increasingly positioned religion at 
the centre of public life, and invoked ¢Ȃ Islamic identity rhetorically and semiotically.  Among 
other things, this has involved a harking back to pre-Republican, Ottoman aesthetics in planning 
and architecture, the building of thousands of mosques, and overt referencing of Ottoman military 
might in public ceremonies.  The party has also implemented policies that have restricted liberal 
lifestyle practices, often explicitly justified in Islamic moral (if not jurisprudential) terms.  This is 
                                                 
2
 For a discussion of Gökalp's culture/civilisation dualism see Ayas (2015) 
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most apparent in legislation relating to alcohol; consumption duty was dramatically increased in 
2010 (GAIN, 2015), and, in an explicit linking of alcohol restrictions to Islam, it was made illegal in 
2013 to open a bar or off-licence within 100m of a mosque (Hürriyet Daily News 2013).  As is discussed 
later in this paper, this holds particular implications for live music, and for indie in particular, owing 
to the Ȃ performance norms and infrastructure.  
 
While the AKP have nominally adhered to the concept of secularism, the manner in which they have 
engaged explicitly with it has been cautious, and incrementally more tepid.  In 2010 Burhan Kuzu, 
a senior AKP figure charged with leading a redrafting of the constitution, asserted that while '[the 
government]  respect[s] Turkey's principles of secularism, ǽǳǾ these principles should be re-
Ȃ3 (Habertürk 2010).  Diken (2014) suggests that the Islamist politics of the AKP 
correspond to a ȁ ǽǾȂǰ which holds Islam as its central value concept rather than 
secularism.   
This dualism of religion and secularism has been widely acknowledged as the defining schism in 
¢Ȃ politics.  As 	ãÍ and Secor (2015) caution however, this is an ȁ Ȃ 
dichotomy (p.22), and many have sought to look beyond it.  Mardin (2005), for example, 
characterises Turkish Republican history in terms of ȁ many-tiered encounter between ȃȄ 
forces and ¢Ȃ (p.160).  Rather than a patterned interaction between religion and secularism, 
he suggests that Ȃ is the specificity of the historical processes that set the character of the social and 
political circumstances, which finally determines that which we must deal with on an everyday 
Ȃ (p.160).  As an example of such specificity, the manner in which the AKP have embraced 
neoliberalism has complicated the dualism of secularism and religion in the Turkish case.  While 
Turkish political Islam was originally conceived in opposition to globalisation and western influence 
(Erol 2011), the AKP have attempted to align Islamic moral principles with neoliberal economics to 
an extent never before seen in Turkey.  This hybrid value system has seen the economy grow 
alongside an upsurge in moral conservatism.  As ċ notes,  
 
ǽǳǾ free-market fundamentalism and fundamentalist Islam are not mutually exclusive. The privatisation of 
public space by an Islamist government [in Turkey] shows that the two forms of fundamentalism can work hand 
in hand ǻċǰ 2013). 
                                                 
3
  ³Biz laiklik ilkelerine saygÕlÕyÕz ancak bu ilkelerin yeniden yorumlanmasÕ gerekti÷ini dúnüyoruz ´ 
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In Istanbul and other major cities in particular, both Islamic and neoliberal signifiers have 
proliferated during the Ȃ incumbency, with huge mosques, shopping malls, tesettür (Islamic 
luxury fashion) advertisements, and multinational mega-brands all increasingly prevalent in the 
urban landscape.  The melding of Islamic signifiers and consumer lifestyle was to be reified in the 
proposed ȁȂ of the historic Topçu ÍóÍ Ottoman military barracks as a brand new 
shopping complex, on the site of Gezi Park.  It was the protests against this development that 
catalysed the subsequent occupation of Taksim Square by a plural movement (Örs and Turan 2015; 
Özdemir 2015) in collective opposition to the concrete effects of Islamic neoliberalism, the 
increasingly authoritarian paternalism of the AKP and Âǰ and subsequently the violent 
response of the police to peaceful protest.  Reports in domestic and international media, together 
with the Ȃ own responses, variously attributed the Gezi protests to the secular eliȂ and 
middle Ȃ discontentment with conservative rule and animosity towards Islam (e.g. Mason 
2013).  Such readings have been challenged, in empirical and theoretical/taxonomic terms. For 
example, Göle (2013) argues that:  
    
While [Gezi] is predominantly a secular movement, it does not embrace old State laicism and animosity against 
Islam. Rejecting the politics of polarization and stigmatization, the Gezi movement is reuniting people across 
ancient divides. The future of Turkish democracy resides in the credo of this movement which asks those in 
power hold their tongues, abstain from moral intrusions and ban violence. (Göle 2013) 
 
Meanwhile, Gürcan and Peker (2015) point to the redundancy of the working-class/middle-class 
distinction in the context of ¢Ȃ growing service-sector precariat.  Like Göle, they acknowledge 
a majority of secular-minded people in the protest movement, but attribute this to conservative 
ideological currents peculiar to Turkish neoliberalism that have subordinated secular segments of 
the wage-earning classes (and associated groups such as the educated unemployed and students) in 
particular by way of ȁ Islamic interventionism [that] threaten[s] [their] life chances and 
living Ȃ (p.17). Gürcan and Peker emphasise the ȁ-Ȃ (p.4) nature of the 
movement, in opposition to the authoritarian governance and oppressive economic strategy of the 
AKP rather than in support or pursuance of any clearly defined political alternative.   
 
According to Diken (2014) it is this counter-hegemonic orientation, which cannot be satisfactorily 
understood in terms of the secular/Islamist dichotomy, that sets the movement apart from both the 
First and Second Republican visions and constitutes a Third Republicanism.  Furthermore, Diken 
 7 
(2014) suggests that the symbolic and spatial focus of Gezi Park represented an apolitical means to 
engage collectively with the possibility of a future beyond that historically entrenched political 
dichotomy:  
 
The demonstrators could imagine a new world only by focusing on a particular problem, the future of the urban 
park. In this sense, the event opened up a new political space, gaining its impetus from an ideological refusal of 
political sovereignty and its economic-governmental apparatuses (p.321). 
 
As such, the protests constituted ȁ first encounter between social and economic classes that had 
grown Ȃǰ whereby ȁ identities managed to form temporal communities to 
challenge the ǽǾȂ neoliberal project ǽǳǾ and conservative majoriȂ (Bilgiç 2015, p.1).  
 
To offer a summary at this point then, the history of Turkish politics from the founding of the 
Republic to the present day can be approached in terms of three republican moments: a staunchly 
secular and western-oriented First Republicanism, an Islamist and morally interventionist, yet 
neoliberal Second Republicanism, and an emerging Third Republicanism defined in immediate 
opposition to the Second, yet which does not oppose Islam per se, nor seek recourse to the First, but 
instead represents a counter-hegemonic, ȁ£ Ȃ (Bilgiç 2015).   As is discussed above, 
the First and Second Republican moments were (/are) accompanied by hegemonic aesthetic 
frameworks actively applied by the State.  Among studies that have approached the Gezi movement 
in aesthetic terms, the employment of ȁ¢ Ȃǰ the appropriation and subversion of 
symbols and performative pluralism have been identified as key strategies (Özdemir 2015; 
Öztürkmen 2014; Varol 2014); yet the aesthetics of Third Republicanism, particularly beyond the 
immediate spatial and temporal boundaries of the Gezi protests themselves, are still emerging and 
have yet to be afforded significant focus.  Later in this paper, I suggest that Ȃ indie scene 
evidences a counter-hegemonic aesthetics and ideology that aligns with the Gezi movement and 
Third Republicanism.   
 
Dualisms in Turkish Popular Music Scholarship 
 
Various dualisms have been proposed and/or applied by scholars to consider how different genres 
of Turkish popular music have reflected and responded to the sociopolitical circumstances 
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discussed above.  It is worth giving a summary account here of this work, as it provides us with 
some theoretical starting points from which to consider the specific case of indie music in Turkey.  
 
Stokes (1992) approaches arabesk, a genre of Turkish popular music prevalent from the 1960s until 
the 1990s (and to a lesser extent beyond),  by way of two concomitant and interwoven dualisms: that 
of secularism and Islam, and that of the centre and periphery.  Stokes (1992) suggests that through 
its conspicuous easternness (as opposed to ȁȂ as understood by Gökalp (1923)), arabesk 
evoked ¢Ȃ Islamic heritage, and articulated the experience of the social periphery in the 
context of rapid industrialisation and globalisation under the policies of the ruling secular (First 
Republican) elite.  In doing so, it served as both a salve and a means of performative resistance 
against the Ȃ westernising project.  Stokes (1992) discusses the Ȃ role in the emergence of 
arabesk as the preeminent Turkish popular music genre, initially inadvertently through the 
censorship of eastern-sounding music on State radio and television, which precipitated an industry 
reliant on alternative distribution channels outside of State control (mainly bootlegged cassettes), 
and later through the co-optation of arabesk by political parties (in political  broadcasts and 
campaigns) seeking to appeal to poorer Ȃ eastern, Islamic identity.  These instances of 
State mediation are presented by Stokes (1992) as issuing from the to and fro between the value 
systems of secularism and Islam, which map onto the demographic divide between a ruling, 
western-oriented, secular-minded centre and a poor, traditional and Islamic periphery.    
 
Özgür (2006) extends Ȃs (1992) focus on arabesk into the early 21st Century, but applies the 
dualisms of secularism and Islam and centre and periphery as aspects of the broader, overarching 
dualism of East and West.  Özgür argues that during the latter half of the 20th Century ȁ became 
a contested arena in the struggle between western modes of cultural expression- radiating from elite 
and urban spheres- and eastern modes of cultural expression radiating from the grassroots portions 
of ¢Ȃ (p.177).  He notes however that arabesk has found appeal beyond its peripheral roots to 
achieve ȁ ¢Ȃ in Turkish tastes, and that ȁ elites, originally the bastion of anti-
easternism in their country, are now embracing Arabesk ǽǳǯǾ at a time when they have become 
doubtful of the Ȃ commitment to Ȃ (p.179).  Paradoxically however, [£ûȂ (2006) 
interviews with music listeners in Turkey suggest that the same traits ascribed to East and West 
within Eurocentric narratives have been internalised and romanticised as part of this reawakening 
to eastern aesthetics, with respondents ȁ¢ on conventional ȁ Ȃ in Turkey that westerners 
are rational and calculating while easterners are irrational and Ȃ (p.185). This can perhaps 
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be understood in terms of 'cultural intimacy' as explored by Stokes (2010), wherein 'aspects of a 
cultural identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment [...] nonetheless provide 
insiders with their assurance of common sociality' (Herzfeld 1997, p.3, quoted in Stokes 2010, p.33).  
Stokes argues in The Republic of Love: Cultural Intimacy in Turkish Popular Music (2010) that at different 
times and in different ways throughout Turkey's 'liberal period' (see above), singers who have 
embodied something of the nation's common sociality have been revered not only as musicians but 
as ideal citizens.  
Â and Skoog (2009) employ Ȃ (1983) dualism of filiation and affiliation to elucidate 
the development of a number of popular music genres in Turkey during the 20th Century.  Broadly 
speaking,  this relates to the processes of engagement/identification with Ȃ parent culture 
(filiation) and with cultures outside of Ȃ heritage (affiliation) respectively.  According to this 
dualism, the state-sponsored promotion of western art music was an act of affiliation.  However, 
rather than an instance of filiation, arabesk is deemed an instance of ȁ Ȃ by 
Â and Skoog (2009, p.57), since it marked not a continuation of historical Turkish forms 
but instead a ȁ ¢Ȃ ǻÂǰ 1996) of predominantly Arab features which had 
an ȁ resonance with performers and Ȃ ǻÂ and Skoog 2009, p.58) and 
(amplified) instrumentation and substructural elements drawn from western popular music.  
 
Further dualisms are applied by Âu and Skoog (2009) in their analysis of 100 Turkish 
popular music songs.  The first of these is that of substructure and superstructure.  They note that 
where Anadolu Rock (Anatolian rock) of the 1960s and 1970s featured a primarily Euro-American 
substructure but drew upon Turkish folk melodies for its superstructure, such experimentations 
would ultimately coalesce into a ȁ-Arabesk-Ȃ (p.63) amalgam across the substructure 
and superstructure of Turkish popular music by the 1990s.  Thus the passage of time complicates 
the filiative/affiliative dualism, since by this point ȁ were no longer clearly ȁȂ or 
ȁȂ because decades of performing foreign music styles had effectively integrated Ȃ 
(p.63), and many historically western substructural elements no longer denoted affiliation.  
 
The second musicological dualism identified by Â and Skoog (2009) corresponds to 
the use of the Phrygian mode and Kürdî makam in the superstructure of Turkish popular music.  The 
makam system is a core principle both in Ottoman art music and Turkish folk music, and although 
each makam corresponds to a series of intervals in the manner of modes in western art music, it is 
more than this, and has an accompanying set of performance and composition rules, based on 
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prescribed routes (sehir) through the notes. Different makams correspond to different musical 
traditions, and are thus a means by which performers denote filiation.   From the 1950s, many 
makams fell into disuse, and performers began to rely on those that resembled western modes, the 
Kürdî makam being most prominent among these and similar to the Phrygian mode in terms of tone 
series (the principal differences being that the latter lacks the Ȃ prescribed performance 
characteristics and quarter tones).  Accordingly, by using Kürdî makam or Phrygian mode, 
performers ȁ simultaneously make gestures of filiation and Ȃ (p.66), and the Kürdî 
makam/Phrygian mode duality thus functions as ȁ musical Janus, showing whichever face the 
listener expects to Ȃ (p.66).    
 
A final dualism that is pertinent to a discussion of Turkish indie is the deterritorialisation/re-
territorialisation dualism adapted from Appadurai (1996) by £ÍÍÂ (2010) in her study of rock 
music consumption in Turkey, which has some theoretical proximity to Ȃ (1983) 
filiation/affiliation dualism as applied by Â and Skoog (2009).  Sitting ambiguously 
within the Turkish popular cultural field, rock music has according to £ÍÍÂ (2010) historically 
been neither opposed by the State nor a significant counter-cultural force, and unlike other cultural 
products of the West was never seen as a form or force of cultural imperialism. £ÍÍÂ considers 
the extents to which rock music has been deterritorialised, that is, ȁ from its [original] social 
context and applied to a new one in a different physical Ȃ or reterritorialised, which involves 
ȁ making of this cultural pattern Ȃ own by producing a local form in this new society and 
¢Ȃ (p.240).   Based on interview and online forum data, £ÍÍÂ (2010) identifies three 
types of rock fan in Turkey - Pro-Westerners, Rock Boomers and Pro-Turkish Rockers Ȯ representing a 
continuum spanning from rock perceived as a deterritorialised and essentially western form, to rock 
perceived as a local form independent of and different to its western counterpart.  The Pro-Western 
fan is typically over 35 years old, educated, and among other characteristics ȁǽǾ the sound of 
rock in Ȃ (p.244), listens primarily to western rock sung in English, and identifies with 
western rock culture.  The Rock Boomer is similarly educated and middle class, but is younger, and 
listens to both mainstream international rock and domestic Turkish rock; for this type of fan, ȁ 
transforms itself into a local genre [but] with a continual dialogue with its [western] Ȃ (p.245).  
The Pro-Turkish Rocker however listens exclusively to Turkish Rock (Türkçe Rock) and feels no affinity 
with western rock at all.  As such, £ÍÍÂ (2010) asserts that ȁ four decades of 
deterritorialization, rock is reterritorialised, making Türkçe Rock a new internalized ¡Ȃ 
 11 
(p.248). £ÍÍÂ (2010) notes that fans of Türkçe Rock can display highly conservative values, 
particularly with regard to notions of (female) sexual purity and modesty.   
 
It can be seen from the work reviewed above that scholars have for the most part sought to 
apprehend Turkish popular music, and its relationship to wider political, cultural, social and 
economic contexts, in dualistic terms.  Taken together, the intersecting dualisms discussed above 
provide a useful framework within which to approach Ȃ indie scene, and help us to situate 
it in relation to the notion of three Republicanisms, discussed earlier.   
 
 Punk, a precursor to indie  
 
Before directly focusing on the case of indie in Istanbul, the case of punk, a direct precursor to indie 
that provided much of the Ȃs infrastructure, aesthetics and ideology (Hesmondhalgh 1999), 
helps to reveal some of the complexities relating to global subculture forms achieving purchase 
within Turkish popular culture.  Despite a resurgence in global punk scholarship, there has been 
scant scholarly focus on the Turkish context.  Among the exceptions, Boynik and 	ûÍȂ book An 
Interrupted History of Punk and Underground Resources in Turkey 1978-1999 (Türkiye'de Punk Ve Í 
¢ÍÍ Kesintili Tarihi 1978-1999) (2008) contains a few short, quasi-academic4 essays in which 
the authors reflect on the status of punk, and the experiences of punks, in Turkey.  The rest of the 
book comprises transcripts of retrospective interviews, photographs and reproductions of fanzine 
covers, gig flyers and other artefacts.  As such, while it offers only a limited scholarly analysis, it is 
a substantial and illuminating archive of primary source material and testimony. 
 
The Ȃ title alludes to the lack of a sustained narrative of punk activity in Turkey, owing largely 
to the post-coup era of the 1980s during which counterculture, from universities to street level, was 
suppressed and all but eradicated. The book thus documents some initial and largely superficial 
experiments with the punk aesthetic by Turkish rock artists in the late 1970s, before moving to the 




                                                 
4.This is not a derogatory description; Boynik explicitly distinguishes the book from academic literature, positioning it somewhere 
between µsubcultural resource¶ and historical testimony, and the editors¶ writing shifts across scholarly and journalistic registers.   
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ȱ Ȃȱ ǻ¢ȱ ŘŖŖŞǰȱ ǯśŜŚǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşşŖȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱȁǽǾȱȱ¢ȱȂȱ ȱȱŗşŞŖȱȱȂȱǻ	ûÍȱȱŘŖŖŞǰȱǯřŜŘǼǯȱȱ 
 
Boynik and 	ûÍ are cautious that they do not, in ¢Ȃ words, ȁ a cow out of a crow 
(Â inek yapmakǼȂ (p.349); that is, exaggerate Ȃ presence and significance in Turkey to the 
point where ȁ non-existent history and a non-existent tradition are Ȃ (p.565).  Boynik makes 
the point that a substantial presence of punk in global contexts can ironically be taken to denote 
healthy cultures of (and safe environments for) dissent, to the extent that punk ironically serves as 
a ȁ Ȃ (p.566) for free, democratic societies.  To overstate the scale of punk in Turkey would 
thus give credence to ¢Ȃ governments and State. According to Boynik then, the small presence 
of punk in Turkey is most revealing by way of its corollary- that it was negligible and largely absent.  
Boynik (2008) equates punk in Turkey to the act of ȁ snails in a Muslim neighbourhood 
(müslüman mahallesinde salyangoz satmakǼȂ (p.568), an expression that at once points to an inherent 
cultural incompatibility and a clumsy attempt at surmounting it.  Boynik highlights ¢Ȃ 
ȁ cultural Ȃǰ which extends across right and left and Islamic and secular and 
thus undermines the absolutism of these conceptual dualisms. Interestingly however, Boynik argues 
that conservative mainstream cultural expectations within Turkey are mirrored both globally as a 
result of the orientalist gaze, and within counterculture by way of ȁ-Ȃ (p.569).  He 
gives the examples of John Peel and Thurston Moore, whom he accuses of fetishising easternness in 
Turkish popular culture and favouring ȁȂ flourishes in Turkish alternative rock and punk, 
and Turkish bands (unnamed) advertising themselves as a synthesis of ȁûslüm Gürses and The 
Ȃ (p.569). Such syntheses with western counterculture have, according to Boynik, become 
normative, such that ironically they evidence a veiled conservatism within the Turkish alternative 
popular culture domain.  As is discussed below, indie bands have voiced frustrations at this same 
expectation among domestic audiences that their music ought to possess a conspicuous  easternness.  
¢Ȃ observations thus offer insight into how the issues of filiation, affiliation and synthesis as 
proposed by Â and Skoog (2009) might play out beyond the mainstream and within 
minority subcultural forms.   Also pertinent for the purposes of this article is that punk in Turkey, 
at least that which is documented in the book, displays no commitment to either First Republican 
aesthetics or to Islamic aesthetics per se; rather, it was resistant to the hegemonic order of the post-
coup period, to the entrenched conservatism of Turkish society, and to mainstream commercial 
culture.  To this extent, it hints at a third vision for Turkey, foreshadowing the Third Republicanism 
emerging in the 2010s.  A significant difference however is the prevailing nihilism that courses 
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through the interviews and artefacts in Boynik and 	ûÍȂ book; there is little discernible intent 
to effect change on a national level, but instead a sense of building alternative social and cultural 
spaces for small, pre-existing social groups, akin to ¢Ȃ (1991) anarchist notion of the temporary 
autonomous zone (TAZ), an emancipated but inevitably transient space within an ongoing narrative 
of suppression and resistance.  In contrast, the examples of Turkish indie discussed below evidence 
a more idealistic outlook heralding the possibilities of protest, collectivism and change through 
critical mass.  
Indie in Istanbul  
 
The term ȁȂ (which is used in its English form in Turkish) is amorphous, and tends to be 
understood tacitly rather than according to explicit definitions. It derives from the word 
ȁȂǰ and originally referred to music released on independent record labels as opposed to 
multinational majors. Although independent labels have been releasing music since the advent of 
commercial recordings, indie as a conceptual term emerged in the UK and USA during the post-
punk era of the late 1970s when independent labels began to curate distinct house styles and harness 
the do-it-yourself spirit of the punk movement in their brand image. By the mid-1980s the term had 
gained traction and began to usurp the term post-punk (Hesmondhalgh 1999). The ethics of indie 
are distinctly more pliable than those associated with punk however, and Ȃ orientation to the 
mainstream is according to Bannister (2006) constantly renegotiated as they seek to simultaneously 
generate income and achieve aesthetic autonomy.  
 
As Hesmondhalgh (1999) notes, indie has ȁ itself to be superior to other genres not only 
because it [is] more relevant or authentic to the youth who produced or consumed it ǽǳǾ but because 
it was based on new relationships between creativity and Ȃ (p.35).  The major/independent 
distinction has become blurred however as independent labels have grown in scope, capacity and 
ambition, and major labels have concurrently sought to capitalise on the ȁȂ cachet by releasing 
music through ȁȂ imprints.  
 
The term has come to denote a genre of music historically associated with independent labels, 
typically featuring guitars but eschewing the virtuosity and flamboyance characterising mainstream 
guitar music at the time of Ȃ emergence.   Exceptions to these aesthetic characteristics 
demonstrate the normative fluidity of indie music, and by extension the instability of the term.  
Internal taxonomic distinctions have emerged (e.g. indie pop, indie rock, indie disco) to account for 
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the lack of musical or conceptual unity, and keep pace with fragmentation occurring as a result of 
the co-optation and appropriation of other musical traditions, which is a central compositional 
strategy within the genre.   Indie, then, is best understood as a primarily ideological descriptor 
corresponding to an orientation towards the counter-mainstream and a disassociation from the 
aesthetics and infrastructure of mass production, rather than a stylistic distinction or a business 
model. As noted earlier, indie, like punk before it, has also presented itself historically as ȁ-
Ȃ (Bannister 2006) and ȁ-Ȃ (Hesmondhalgh 1999; Jones 2013). 
 
These definitional complexities present challenges for classifying music within this study.  Some of 
the artists discussed below have explicitly described themselves as indie acts, either in interviews or 
on their Facebook or other social media pages. In such cases, attributing the classification of ȁȂ 
is to some extent straightforward, in that it corresponds to Ȃ self-identification (see discussion 
of The Revolters, below). Other artists covered here describe their music using other labels such as 
ȁ Ȃ or ȁ Ȃǰ but have been referred to as ȁȂ by third parties such as music critics. 
Beyond this, there is no obvious meaningful way to render this classification more precise without 
ignoring Ȃ aesthetic heterogeneity, discussed above.   In any case, as is demonstrated across 
the literature reviewed in the previous section, the fluidity of musical aesthetics and their 
subsequent classification is crucial to our understanding of popular Ȃ function in the 
formulation and expression of identity. In acknowledgement of this, the challenge of taxonomy is 
approached discursively as necessary. 
 
Like punk before it, indie music appears to have had a minimal presence in Turkey compared to 
that of other diasporic Anglo-American genres, despite the boom in guitar bands from the 1990s 
onwards (Stokes 2012, cited in Dawe and Â 2013; £ÍÍÂ 2010). A short series of Youtube 
films by amateur filmmaker Karl Ertunc called ȁȂ documents, as its title suggests, an 
indie music scene in Istanbul. My use of the indefinite article is important here as the films make no 
claim to comprehensiveness in documenting the Istanbul indie scene, or offering the definitive 
narrative of indie in Istanbul.  That said, the infrastructure for original live music in Istanbul is small, 
and is centred in two main loci ǻ¢Â and Íã¢), such that other scenes would likely intersect 
with those portrayed by Ertunc.  Today, these areas hold the highest concentration of music 
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performance spaces in Istanbul.  Original live music is a comparative rarity however, and limited to 
a small number of dedicated venues.5 
 
The sale and consumption of alcohol is thoroughly embedded into ¢ÂȂ and Íã¢Ȃ 
nightlife.  As noted earlier however, successive restrictions on the sale of alcohol imposed by the 
AKP have impacted on the live music industry.  In particular, the restriction banning young people 
under the age of 24 from attendance at concerts where alcohol is served provoked fears for the 
survival of indie performance spaces (Golz, 2013), although this was subsequently lifted.  
Furthermore, sponsorship of live music by alcohol brands has been banned, a move that Ekin Sanaç 
of the indie band Kim Ki O suggests will have a crippling effect on ¢Ȃ live music culture:  
 
ȁǽǳǾ the economy is structured more privately than in the EU, it is normal that many music events and festivals 
are sponsored by alcohol brands. Now they have shut this off, which affects the cultural life in the city directly. 
The events Ȃ know how to finance themselves ¢ǯȂ (quoted in Golz, 2013) 
 
Other musicians interviewed by Golz (2013) draw links between the Ȃ legislation and 
an underpinning Islamist ideology.  Murat Ertel, singer from the band Baba Zula, suggests that the 
alcohol legislation illustrates the Ȃ ȁ face, ǽǳǾ their fundamentalist, non-secular 
Ȃǯ  Â Yücel, editor of the music magazine Blue Jean, suggests that the Ȃ effect on 
live rock music is not a side effect but a deliberate consequence; similarly Serhat Eman of indie band 
The Revolters believes that this effective curtailing of alternative music is calculated, and motivated 
by a distrust of the West:  
 
The government is rejecting different colours of sound, because it is a fundamentalist, Islamist government in 
Turkey right now and they are against the Western culture and all those things that represent the West.  Music is 
one of them, because it is the symbol of freedom and they are against the freedom. (quoted in Golz, 2013).  
 
 
                                                 
5Hecker¶s (2010; 2012) ethnographic research into heavy metal in Turkey reveals many points of similarity and intersection with 
punk and indie.  Most significantly, Hecker demonstrates how Istanbul¶s historical Ottoman demographics, particularly the 
concentration of non-Muslim minorities and international diplomatic and business communities in Beyo÷lu, together with reforms to 
alcohol laws from the Tanzimat period  (1839±1876) onwards, set the conditions from which new lifestyle norms and public spaces 
(beer halls, and later bars) emerged. This in turn provided spaces for subcultures such as metal to formulate following the 1980 coup.  
Hecker (2010) notes that the beer halls (birahaneler) that would later develop into metal bars were kept afloat in large part by college 
students from the elite high schools and lycées in Beyo÷lu. As in the case of indie, the heavy metal scene demographics still 
correspond to this secular middle class.  
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Native Turk 4-piece The Revolters were formed in 2006 (Hanngar Röportaj 2013) and are the subject 
of the first ȁȂ film dating from 2011, which intersperses live footage with interviews in 
which the band discuss their affinity with indie as a genre, their experiences of playing indie music 
in Turkey and their future ambitions. The band repeatedly differentiate themselves from 
mainstream Turkish music and musicians, in terms of style, content and approach, and speak of the 
parochial tastes and expectations that they hope to circumvent.  In particular, they highlight 
resistance among Turkish audiences to original live music, and to bands who do not follow the 
accepted route to market:  
 
Serhat [singer]: In England it is normal to see groups playing their own music in clubs. For example Babyshambles 
ǽǳǾ were doing that, but in Istanbul they couldn't understand the concept of a new band playing their own songs 
instead of covers. It had never been done before and people thought it was strange. 
ǽǳǾ 
Murat [drummer]: Ȃ an assumption in this country that you have to start locally ǽǳǾ here in Istanbul, then 
more nationally and then try internationally. After becoming famous in Turkey, then you can start singing in 
English or you can participate in the Eurovision, etc. and then you can start to play abroad. But for the first time 
ever we are a group who doesn't think like that (Ertunc 2011). 6 
 
The band report having received a more positive response from foreign gig-goers, which they 
attribute to ȁǽǾȂ in international listening tastes that have yet to arrive in Turkey.  They 
assert that indie is a ȂȂ genre with a global listenership, and that there is ȁ Ȃ 
between themselves and UK and US bands other than the fact that ȁ¢ are in the West, we are in 
the Ȃǯ They explain that while ȁ whole world is listening to indie ǽǳǾ it Ȃ come to Istanbul 
¢Ȃǰ but they are optimistic about the future:  
 
For Turkey, we are trying something new. ǽǳǾ Ȃ more than a band limited to Istanbul.  We want to make 
universal music.  
ǽǳǾ 
 The Turkish people are opening up to the outside world.  We believe that we are doing an international thing. 
 [ǳǾ 
There's a saying 'without courage, you can never win a battle'. We've shown some courage, and as a result of that, 
we have reached a certain place. Now the time has come for us to play gigs outside Turkey (Ertunc 2011).  
 
                                                 
6
 Quotations here are taken from Ertunc's English subtitles (the interview in the film is conducted in Turkish).  
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The band express no intention of establishing a distinctly Turkish indie sound, or distinguish 
between Turkish and (for example) English indie, but see both as part of a global indie phenomenon. 
They refer to Turkish Ȃ taste for eastern or arabesk elements, both in terms of 
instrumentation and lyrical themes:  
 
Murat [drums]: People have always wanted something ethnic, a darbouka, a saz.  In the Turkish spirit there's 
always a kind of pessimism, a kind of loss, and people have always liked bands that reflect this attitude. 
 
Berkan [guitar]: Honestly, at first, the most difficult decision to make was to follow the easy road or the difficult 
road - to choose whether to make music to appeal to a large Turkish audience, i.e. to include Anatolian elements 
to our music which is expected here, or to make our own music, the music we feel (Ertunc 2011).  
 
While the band speak favourably of some artists, they are generally disparaging of attempts by 
Turkish bands to infuse their music with local, Turkish features:  
 
Serhat [vocals] They define themselves within that border. This is what their problem is - they see cultural 
divisions. We play without frontiers, they play within frontiers. 
  
Berkan [guitar]: 'this is our culture', this is how they perceive things. By the way, we love our culture, we've got 
nothing against that. But at the same time where's the world going? The idea of 'we do this over here, they do 
that over there, we do it like this in Turkey', to be honest, we don't think it's that important anymore (Ertunc 2011) 
 
In contrast, guitarist Berkan suggests that the band have ȁ to create something Ȃ by 
avoiding eastern signifiers; there is no sense that they conceive of Indie as necessarily western.  The 
band sing in English, which drummer Murat argues ȁ Ȃ in Turkey and was a ȁ Ȃǰ 
but this is justified on the basis of universalism (and English as lingua franca), rather than a desire to 
emulate English or American  bands specifically.  It appears therefore that, at the time of this 2011 
interview, the Revolters conceived of indie as a deterritorialised global form with roots in the west, 
but which is not exclusively open to the West or western per se.  We can align the Ȃ position in 
this regard with £ÍÍ ࡅluȂs Pro Western rock fan type, who consider themselves ȁbelong[ing] to 
western rock Ȃ and see rock as a genre ȁ borrowed from the West, but ǽǳǾ a global 
phenomenon [open to] anybody who likes the Ȃ (2010, p.245, my emphasis). Unlike 
£ÍÍࡅluȂs (2010) Pro Western rock fan however, they are not opposed to globalisation as a 
phenomenon and actively celebrate the ȁ Ȃ of Turkish audiences to the aesthetics of the 
ȁ  ȂǱ  
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Berkan [guitar]: We've appeared at exactly that time and we don't need to cater to typical Turkish tastes. We 
believe we're doing an international thing, and the interesting thing is that Turkish audiences are now adopting 
this outlook.  In the past that wouldn't be possible (Ertunc 2011). 
 
 Considering themselves to be at the forefront of cultural change in Turkey, they speak of a ȁ  
Ȃ that might over time cause ȁ repressive and conservative outlook [to] Ȃ (Berkan 
[guitarist]). 
 
Interestingly, in 2013 the banȂ members formed a second band, Gri7, under which name they 
released a single, ȁ	û kȂ (Sin City), comprising Turkish lyrics, a chorus melody composed in 
Phrygian mode (see figure 2), and lyrics that overtly reference Turkey, all absent from the Ȃ 
songs.  The lyrics to ȁ	û kȂ border on the  arabesk in their portrayal of Istanbul as a seductive, 
deceitful and corrupting city, although the playful delivery is far removed from the melodrama and 
anguish of arabesk, and the video features the band performing in a bar to a crowd of urbane twenty-
somethings.  This move towards Turkish language rock might most obviously suggest a desire on 
The Ȃ part to target a domestic audience and market segment, but might also suggest a 
softening of the Ȃ earlier resistance to local aesthetics displayed in the interview quoted above.  
Alternatively, the Phrygian melody might be interpreted as holding no deliberate connotation, 
instead exemplifying the ȁ-Ȃ quality of the Phrygian mode in Turkish popular music and/or 
the temporal erosion of the filiative/affiliative distinction in relation to stylistic elements, both 
identified by Karahasanoࡅlu and Skoog (2009).  In any case, however this is interpreted, across the 
rest of the RevoltȂ output and interviews up to and including 2013, their championing of a global 
cultural orientation and liberal lifestyle and resistance to cultural conservatism are more 
pronounced than any resistance to eastern aesthetics per se.  Their musical aesthetic can be 
characterised as internationalist and cosmopolitan, and accompanies a professed counter-
hegemonic ideological orientation; as discussed above, the band have been outspoken in interviews 
about the moral interventionism of the AKP government.  
 
Like the Revolters, the Away Days sing in English and are ostentatiously international in outlook 
and aspiration. Their name refers to their lack of a sense of belonging to Istanbul, and enjoyment of 
travel outside of Turkey (Reevell, 2013).  In interviews, singer Â£ Can Özen has regularly 
                                                 
7
 In interviews as Gri, the band make no secret of also being in the Revolters.  
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highlighted the extent to which the Away ¢Ȃ sound is at odds with Turkish mainstream tastes. 
For example:  
 
When people hear us they say, 'Oh my god, that band can't be from Turkey, because even Turkish rock bands 
have a Middle Eastern sound' (quoted in Todd 2015).   
 
The Away Days participated actively in the Gezi Park protests, and the Ȃ drummer Berk 
Tekelioࡅlu was seriously injured when a gas canister hit him on the head.  In an interview with the 
NME (Reevell 2013), Özen explained that the Ȃ reasons for participating in the protests were 
not political:  
 
Ȃ not a political band-  Ȃ not like the Beatles. But when we saw how the police attacked those people, we 
went out to protest among thousands of other people.  Ȃ not about politics, Ȃ about defending basic human 
rights (quoted in Reevell 2013).  
 
The Away Days were also affected by the ban on alcohol advertising for music concerts (discussed 
above), which led to the cancellation of the One Love Festival in Í¢ǰ where they were scheduled 
to perform alongside English indie acts such as Foals and the Vaccines (bands they cite as major 
influences).  Özen links moral conservatism of this kind directly with the protest movement:  
 
The government is intervening in Ȃ lifestyles, which is a main reason these protests have gotten so big. 
Turkey is not Iraq or Iran. I want Erdogan (sic) to resign. ǽǳǾ In two weeks a generation has awakened. ǽǳǾ I 
want to say to Erdogan (sic): Ȃ bother us. Ȃ touch our music. Ȃ touch our rights (quoted in Reevell 
2013).  
 
ÖzenȂ comments here convey a strong sense of generational collectivism, wherein music is a marker 
of identity and a totemic asset of liberalism.  Like the Revolters therefore, the Away Days align 
themselves with a growing movement in opposition to the hegemonic conservatism of the AKP. 
Indeed, while the context is quite different, the RevoȂ and the Away ¢Ȃ outspoken desire to 
wrest the Ȃ cultural and social destiny from the state is redolent of the sense of civic duty 
identified by Stokes (2010) on the parts of Orhan Gencebay and Sezen Aksu at earlier periods in the 
Ȃs history, which implies a distinctly counter-hegemonic ideal of citizenship.  
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Garage rock three-piece the Ringo Jets have also spoken in interviews of their participation in the 
Gezi protests (Tez 2014).  Although they do not use the term indie to describe their music, they 
participate within the same scene as bands such as the Away Days and the Revolters, share the same 
spaces (rehearsal space, venues) and audiences, espouse an independent, DIY ethos and have been 
identified as an indie band in media (e.g. Parker, 2014).  In any case, as Bannister (2006) notes, the 
groundwork for the modern garage rock revival was laid by indie, such that the distinction between 
the two genres is porous.  All of their Ȃ lyrics are in English, and most employ idiomatic clichés 
drawn from and/or referencing blues and rock (e.g. ȁ got that black coffee ȂǼǯ  In contrast 
however, the lyrics to their song ȁ of Ȃ directly express feelings of oppression, suffocation 
and suffering:  
 
Well they are isolating 
Manipulating 
Toxicating 
And it's suffocating us 
 
Well you can smell it in the air 
The spring of war is here (The Ringo Jets 2013) 
 
Although no explicit reference is made here to the Gezi protests of 2013, these lyrics depict the mood 
of the protest movement and obliquely reference the Ȃ treatment of protesters8.  In contrast, the 
music video features direct images and slogans from the Gezi protests, thus rendering the Ȃ 
thematic content unambiguous. The video features the Ȃ drummer Lale ó as a television 
news anchor lip-syncing the lyrics as if reading them from a teleprompter (Image 1), while Deniz 
Âǰ one of the Ȃ guitarists, plays the part of a reporter in the field (Image 2).   The song lyrics 
also move across the bottom of the screen throughout as ȁ  Ȃ-style ticker tape. These 
scenes are interspersed with found footage of the protests in Taksim Square and elsewhere, to 
simulate live reportage.  The Ȃ second guitarist Tarkan Â plays the part of a 
weatherman who, instead of placing meteorological symbols on a map, applies symbols denoting 
protest and police violence, such as gas masks, shields and water cannon, to an aerial photo of Gezi 
Park (Image 3).  Perhaps the clearest condemnation of the State comes in the form of an advert for a 
cleaning product, ȁ£¢Ȃǰ which is able to erase stains of ȁȂǰ ȁȂǰ and 
                                                 
8
 According to the band¶s drummer Lale, the lyrics originally referred to the Tahrir Square protests in Egypt in 2011.  
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ȁ of Ȃ (Images 4 and 5).   In its comic juxtaposition and playful use of symbols 
therefore, the video to ȁing of Ȃ exemplifies the revolutionary humour and semiotic 
subversion identified by Özdemir (2015) and Varol (2014) as key aesthetic strategies of the Gezi 
movement.  
 
Musically, ȁ of Ȃ follows the blues rock-influenced style of the majority of the Ȃ 
recorded output, featuring a harmonic structure based around chords I, IV and V, heavily distorted 
guitars, and vocal melodies, guitar riffs and solos primarily in the minor pentatonic scale.  Live 
however, the band are known to incorporate covers of famous Turkish television advert jingles, and 
have spoken of their passion for Turkish psychedelia from the 1970s (Hawkins 2013), suggesting an 
openness to local influences outside of the Anglo-American rock vernacular.   
 
Among the indie bands who frequently perform at venues such as Peyote, KargART and Pendor 
Corner are many that comprise non-Turkish members, typically English or American, who work in 
the city as English language teachers.  One such band was Scorpio Rising, an Istanbul ȁart Ȃ band, 
active between 2011 and 2014, who feature in the ȁȂ films.  The band comprised both 
native Turks and English immigrants, and were led by English singer-songwriter Sean Parker.  
During his time in Istanbul (he has since been deported from Turkey for overstaying his visa by 10 
years) Parker also worked as a music journalist, promoter and English teacher, and alongside self-
releasing his own music also curated two compilation albums, ȁ Dogs Ȃ and ȁȂǰ of Istanbul-
based indie artists.   
 
 
The lyrics to Scorpio Ȃ song ȁ ¢Ȃ (2013) make no explicit reference to the Gezi 
protests of 2013, but instead reference them obliquely through repeated incantations of associated 
locations ǻȁ ¢Ȃǰ ȁÍã¢Ȃǰ ȁtûȂǼǯ The vocal is shared by Parker and two Turkish 
female backing singers, though Ȃ voice is loudest in the mix.  An interesting effect of this 
doubling is that while Parker delivers the lines in an English accent, the other Ȃ Turkish 
enunciation can be heard beneath, in particular in the rounding off of the word ȁtûȂ with a 
sibilant fricative ȁȂǰ marking the song with a sense of both native voice and cosmopolitanism.  The 
substructural instrumentation is western, comprising drums, bass guitar and electric guitar, and the 
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substructure is built around the Phrygian mode9, the bass figure based around the tonic and 
dominant, moving to flattened second and sixth in the root. The superstructure of vocals and violin 
is also Phrygian. The violin also makes use of double stops with a droning open string, an effect that 
evokes the Kemençe, a bowed lute that commonly accompanies folk dancing.  A guitar solo in 
Phrygian dominant mode10 is performed on a nylon stringed flamenco guitar. These elements 
arguably all connote ¢Ȃ eastern aspect, and thus underscore the Ȃ lyrics, which are also 
rare within the Ȃ oeuvre for explicitly referencing Turkey.  ȁ ¢Ȃ can therefore be 
read as an oblique protest song in which identity and geography are expressed through the use of 
figurative musical and linguistic elements. 
 
In applying the affiliation/filiation dualism as proposed by Karahasanoࡅlu and Skoog (2009) we 
encounter some complexity in the fact that the Ȃ composer is an Englishman, while the band is 
comprised mainly of native Turks.  In this respect, the song can be seen as an product of Ȃ 
cosmopolitanism, and the issue of affiliative and filiative gesturing is thus complicated both by the 
passage of time (Karahasanoࡅlu and Skoog, 2009) and by different (a/)filiative cultures represented 
in the band collective.  Furthermore, where earlier examples of eastern tropes being incorporated 
into Turkish popular music can be understood as ȁ-Ȃ (Karahasanoࡅlu and Skoog, 
2009) in response to the western affiliations of First Republicanism (Diken 2014), this song is a 
response to the Islamist and neoliberal AKP Ȃ treatment of a pluralist protest 
movement. As such, its eastern-sounding elements cannot be read as signifiers of a suppressed 
Islamic heritage as in the case of arabesk; rather, they connote a less straightforwardly ideological 
identity that defies dualistic codification.  
 
Although the Phrygian mode is not employed in the music of the Ringo Jets, the Away Days or the 
Revolters (with the exception of the Ȃ work as Gri), the Phrygian/makam dualism is nonetheless 
useful in this case for highlighting the widespread absence of eastern connotative elements in most 
                                                 
9
 Or Phrygian dominant; the third interval is not played, although see next footnote regarding the guitar solo.  
10
 This is in D. The beginning of the solo effects a Phrygian descent in the home key of A through the tetrachord of D, C, Bb, A, 
common to both Phrygian mode in A and Phrygian dominant mode in D.  A second solo, also in D, is performed over the B section 




This is in D. The solo initially descends (0.39-0.41) through the notes of D, C, Bb and A, effecting a phrygian descent in the song¶s 
home key of A (also the Kurd tetrachord), continuing through G, Fsharp, Eb. D, the first tetrachord of the Phrygian dominant mode 
in D (also the Hijaz tetrachord).  This is resolved in the song¶s B section (1.06-1.28) which modulates to the Phrygian dominant in D 
across all tonal elements.  
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Turkish indie, in contrast to the overwhelming majority of Turkish popular music.  For the Away 
Days and the Revolters, the rejection of such eastern signifiers is a calculated gesture of aesthetic 
distance from the Turkish mainstream.  Ȃ politics of taste bring an additional layer of 
significance here.  Bannister (2006) argues that Ȃ aesthetics have developed in part through a 
rejection of black popular music tropes Ȯ taken to denote a corrupted, commercialised mainstream 
Ȯ and the imagining of an affiliative lineage issuing from white, male groups of the 1960s, which 
have in turn positioned a canonical ȁ Ȃ at the crux of indie conceptions of authenticity.  The 
ideological and aesthetic associations of Anglo-American indie do not traverse straightforwardly to 
indie in its deterritorialised, Turkish form, but we must acknowledge at least the trace of these 
canonical practices, the aesthetic hierarchies they sustain, and in turn the demographic hierarchies 
they have been taken to imply. There are clear points of analogy (though not equivalency) with the 
Turkish context, in which a historically dominant, western-oriented ȁ Ȃ elite has delimited 
its cultural space through a narrow Eurocentric canonicity and a deliberate eschewal of peripheral, 
eastern tastes.  The demographic of Ȃ indie scene is largely middle-class, secular and 
educated (Parker, 2015), and thus might be equated (prima facie) with this White Turk elite, in the 
same way that the Gezi protest movement has been (see above).  Yet, as discussed earlier, historical 
understandings of class and socioeconomic status in Turkey have been problematised by the 
emergence of a secular-minded, educated service sector precariat with no footing at the centre of 
Turkish society; the demographics of Turkish indie would appear to align more closely with this 
emerging class than with the erstwhile secularist elite.  Moreover, indie (in the global context) has 
historically aligned itself with the politics of power struggle, and despite its adherence to canon is 
ȁ-Ȃ (Bannister 2006, p.86).   A crucial distinction to make in this regard is that 
between cultural capital as proposed by Bourdieu, which in material and embodied forms confers 
power upon elites and reinforces social hierarchy, and subcultural capital as proposed by Thornton 
(1995), which corresponds to youth culture enlightenment and ȁȂǰ conceived in stark 
opposition to ȁȂ society.  Accordingly, Ȃ (sub) cultural capital corresponds not to 
dominant groups within Turkish society, but to notions of counter-hegemonic ȁȂ 
(Bannister 2006).  In this respect, Turkish indie stands in aesthetic opposition to both the Islamist-
neoliberal elites associated with Second Republicanism, and the Eurocentric elites of First 
Republicanism, and corresponds to a newer, counter-hegemonic aesthetic paradigm that chimes 





On the 17 June 2016 - almost to the moment that I began to draft the conclusion to this paper Ȯ a 
launch party for the band Ȃ album ȁA Moon Shaped Ȃ at Velvet IndieGround, a small 
independent record store in the Çukurcuma neighbourhood of ¢Âǰ was attacked by a gang of 
25 men wielding metal bars. The attack received global media attention.  The public consumption of 
alcohol during ramazan appears to have been the Ȃ principal grievance, but the altercation 
speaks more broadly to the ideological fault lines in Turkish society, discussed in this paper, and is 
an example of how tensions and identity politics can play out around culture and lifestyle practices, 
often violently, particularly in areas that have undergone rapid gentrification.  As discussed in this 
paper, alcohol is thoroughly woven into the indie lifestyle in Turkey, and was also a totemic cause 
célèbre of the Gezi protests, and as such can be read as a unit of discursive practice through which 
liberalism and resistance to conservative hegemony are performed within the public sphere.  This is 
not to cast the listening party as a formal ritual of protest, but to emphasise that within this contested 
ideological and cultural landscape, lifestyle practices inevitably constitute symbolic vocabulary.11 
ÂȂ apportioning of equal blame to the attackers and partygoers (Hürriyet Daily News 
2016b), and suggestions on social media that ¢ÂȂ authorities were complicit in the attack (there 
was no police response) together illustrate both the perception of and actual moral interventionism 
by the State.  Two days later on the 19th June 2016, a crowd of three hundred staged a sit-in protest 
in £Â Square in Cihangir, close to Velvet IndieGround, and in scenes reminiscent of Gezi, were 
dispersed using water cannon and teargas (Hürriyet Daily News 2016).   
 
Indie is by no means the only genre of music that can be associated with recent opposition to 
authoritarian rule and moral interventionism in Turkey, but as this paper has shown, indie 
musicians have perceived an ideological affinity between the aesthetics of indie and the values of 
liberalism, internationalism, and resistance to both conservatism and consumerism, that characterise 
the Third Republican vision as identified by Diken (2014), and have employed these aesthetics in 
expressing a counter-hegemonic orientation and identity.  The form of these expressions can vary 
significantly however, in ways that at once enrich and destabilise the dualisms by which Turkish 
popular music, and its relationship to society, have been understood. For example, the use of 
affiliative and filiative elements is complicated both by the passage of time and by heterogenous 
demographics, and the dualism of West (vs) East cannot be read in terms of a politically connotative 
                                                 
11
 See also Hecker (2010) for a discussion of lifestyle practices among metal fans as µclear statements that Muslimness is not a 
relevant category for most of them¶ (p.10).  
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aesthetics where the former corresponds to Eurocentrism and secularism and the latter to Islamic 
heritage, and takes on a more fluid and less essentialist aspect in both its political and aesthetic 
dimensions.  Applying the dualism of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation however requires 
a caveat; as noted earlier, I make no claims to have represented Istanbul indie comprehensively, and 
the constraints of time and word-count are such that I have only been able to cover a selection of 
bands, chosen on the basis of relevance to the themes discussed.  All of the bands discussed sing in 
English and cite English and American music as their primary influences, and display a take on  
indie as a global, deterritorialised form with its origins in the Anglo-American context; it is essential 
however not to gloss over the existence of many Turkish indie bands who sing in Turkish (such as 
Kim Ki O, quoted earlier), and Turkish indie record labels (such as Shalgam Records) whose rosters 
feature predominantly Turkish-language indie (comprising subgenres such as psych, electro, 
bluegrass and folk).  Such examples suggest the possibility of a reterritorialised, Turkish indie music, 
targeted towards domestic audiences and not beholden to the norms of the Ȃ Anglo-American 
ȁȂ context.  Yet, reviewing these Ȃ social media and web profiles, I was struck by the extent 
to which, aside from their choice of language, their music and attendant visual style were broadly 
similar to those of the bands reviewed, and indeed to those of indie bands from other global contexts, 
and did not convey a sense of localism nor nationalist inwardness as identified by £ÍÍࡅlu in 
respect of Türkçe Rock.  Depictions of liberal lifestyle practices, such as drinking beer (see Image 6) 
were common, and eastern musical elements were rare, if not non-existent. This suggests that if 
Turkish indie is undergoing a process of reterritorialisation, this is not occurring via a process of 
synthesis with hegemonic conservative aesthetics or cultural or moral norms, but rather with the 
liberal, counter-hegemonic outlook associated with the emerging vision of Third Republicanism.   
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